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FORUM NON CONVENIENS:




Forum Non Conveniens is a theory of law that allows dismissal of a
case when the three procedural requirements for allowing a lawsuit to go
forward are met, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Personal Jurisdiction and
Venue. The theory is that the court in which the lawsuit was originally
filed is not substantially the most convenient court and that the suit
should therefore be dismissed in favor of a more convenient court.' Al-
though the Supreme Court has said that the "doctrine of forum non con-
veniens has a long history,"2 its history is of relatively recent origins.
Once again, although the theory has a latin name, no scholar has ever
traced its use to Roman or continental courts. The theory has its origins in
19h Century Scottish Courts, where the term inconvenient forum was
loosely translated into the latin forum non conveniens. The word was
used to distinguish from forum non competens, or those procedural dis-
missals based on lack of jurisdiction versus those dismissals based on
discretion of the court.3
The theory was first used in the admiralty courts under other names
in the United States in the early part of the 19th Century. A law journal
article in 1929 by Paxton Blair extolled the virtues of forum non conveni-
ens dismissals, the greatest one being the virtue of reducing congestion in
certain overly used courts, such as the Southern District of New York.
The article influenced the minds of judges at that time and the theory
gained wider usage under the name of forum non conveniens. 4 The de-
1, GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CivIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 289
(1996).
2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981), reprinted in BORN, supra
note 1 at 289.
3. BORN, supra, note 1, at 289-90.
4. BORN, supra, note 1, at 292-3.
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fining opinion for the common law theory of forum non conveniens came
in a 1947 case entitled Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert.
A. Gulf Oil Company v. Gilbert and the basic elements of Forum Non
Conveniens
The plaintiff was a Virginian who owned a warehouse with gasoline
pumps supplied by Gulf Oil Corp. The warehouse caught fire and burned
as gas was being unloaded from trucks to the tanks. The Virginian as-
serted claims against Gulf Oil for its negligence in transferring the gas
from the trucks to the holding tanks. Gulf Oil was a corporation regis-
tered in Pennsylvania but also doing business in New York. The plaintiff
filed suit in New York. The trial court dismissed due to forum non con-
veniens. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the
trial court and dismissed due to forum non conveniens although subject
matter, personal jurisdiction and venue were present.' The Court identi-
fied three elements that were necessary for a dismissal.
The first element was that there must be an adequate alternative fo-
rum. The Court ruled that this forum would be Virginia. The court said
that "In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes
into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between
them."6
The second element was that the criteria must weigh strongly against
the plaintiff. The court said that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."7
Finally, the court identified the criteria that must be weighed or bal-
anced. These criteria, the court identified as public and private interest
factors. The court declined to give an absolute rendition of what these
factors must be, but it noted that the "doctrine leaves much to the discre-
tion of the court to which the plaintiff resorts."8 However, it did give a list
of what this court saw the public and private interest factors to be. To this
day, these factors and the balancing of them between the plaintiff and the
defendant is used to determine in large part whether to dismiss the case.
The Gilbert court identified the following private interest factors:
The relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory proc-
ess for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
5- Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502. Similar facts are also summarized in
BORN, supra, note 1 at 294.
6. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-7. Reprinted in BORN, supra, note I at 295, although Born
does not describe it as an element.
7. Id. at 508.
8. Id. at 508 reprinted in BORN, supra, note 1 at 295. Once again, I attribute this idea
largely to Born's interpretation.
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witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action .. all other practical problems ... the enforceability of judgment ... and
[whether] the plaintiff [seeks] vex, harass or oppress the defendant. 9
The court identified the following public interest factors:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in con-
gested centers, ... Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the
people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is a reason for holding the trial in their
view. ... There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. '
0
The Court's analysis of these factors included such reflection that the
evidence was all in Virginia, that the defense would want to interplead an
independent contractor in Virginia, and that Virginia law would apply,
something with which Virginia courts would be familiar, but that New
York courts would not be. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the plain-
tiff's only major point against holding the trial in New York, that of the
provincialism of the residents of Lynchburg, Virginia, which would not
allow them to award large damage amounts. The court noted that the
plaintiff chose to do business there, and should, therefore expect a jury
trial there."
B. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno
Piper concerned a wrongful death action on behalf of Scottish citi-
zens who died in Scotland during a charter plane flight with a Scottish
passenger company against the Pennsylvania manufacturers of the pro-
peller and Ohio manufacturers of the plane. In the case of Piper Aircraft
Corp. v. Reyno the Supreme Court made three holdings that concern the
basic elements of the forum non conveniens analysis. The Court held that
one, there may be an adequate alternative forum even if the substantive
law of the alternative forum is different from the plaintiff's chosen forum
and negates some of the plaintiff's claims,'2 two, the fact that the real
parties at interest are foreigners meant that the plaintiff's side of the
Gilbert scale should not be given added weight, 3 and, three, the balanc-
ing of the Gilbert factors led to dismissal due to more weight being on the
defendant's side even though the defendant propeller manufacturing and
9. Id.
10. Id.
11- See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at509-11.
12. See Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 249,
13. See Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 255-6.
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engineering design center was in the federal district where the trial was to
be held.14
C. Analysis of Gilbert Factors by the Court in Piper
The Court found that the Gilbert factors led towards dismissal from
the plaintiff's chosen forum. They did note that "Particularly with respect
to the question of relative ease of access to sources of proof, the private
interest factors point in both directions."' 5 They noted that there were the
sources of proof that the defendant would supply, which would weigh in
the plaintiff's favor. These sources would be the "records concerning the
design, manufacture, and testing of the propeller and plane (engine)."' 6
These records were located in the United States, and therefore would lead
to having the trial in the United States.
However, the Court noted that there were significant problems due to
the fact that the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter com-
pany could not be impleaded in the United States. The Court noted that
liability on the part of any of the above three could relieve the plane and
propeller manufacturer of all liability. The Circuit Court had noted that
the plane and propeller manufacturer could always go to Scotland and
hold trial there for indemnification. But the Court felt that two trials
would place a burden on the defendants and saw it as a factor towards
dismissal.'7 Finally, although the Court noted that the private interest
factors could go either way, the Court said that the public interest factors
weighed heavily towards holding trial in Scotland. The Court said that
Scottish law might apply, which would lead towards holding trial in
Scotland. Then they said that:
Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation. The accident occurred in its
airspace. All of the decedents were Scottish. Apart from Piper (the plane manu-
facturer) and Hartzell (the propeller manufacturer), all potential plaintiffs and
defendants are either Scottish or English. As we stated in Gilbert, there is 'a lo-
cal interest in having localized controversies decided at home.' Respondent ar-
gues that American citizens have an interest in ensuring that American manu-
facturers are deterred from producing defective products.... However, the in-
cremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an American
court is likely to be insignificant."
In summary, the Court believed that district court did not abuse its dis-
14. See Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 257-9.
15. Id. at 257.
16. Id.
17- Id. at 259.
18. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 260.
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cretion in stating that the private and public interest factors should weigh
towards dismissal.
Even though the Court did not state this specifically, there were
many factors of proof for holding the case in Scotland. The maintenance
logs were in Scotland. The air traffic controllers log was in Scotland. The
British equivalent of the FAA had a preliminary hearing that showed pro-
peller malfunction, then a review board hearing that showed possible
fault on the part of the pilot. Any evidence regarding the abilities of the
pilot, including personal logs, would be in Scotland. Evidence that would
go towards damages, such as loss of consortium and support, which
would come in the form of testimony by surviving family members,
would be in Scotland. Finally, should the choice of law analysis lead to
Scottish law applying, then there would be problems of proof as to what
that law was. All of these factors, which were mainly evidentiary prob-
lems, would all point towards holding trial in Scotland.
However, other cases have presented dissenting opinions to the
opinions expressed in Piper. Although the Supreme Court has not found
them to be persuasive, they were good opinions, and should be noted.
The Texas state court system did not recognize the common law
practice of forum non conveniens until recently. The Supreme Court of
Texas ruled that the legislature had effectively abolished the theory of
forum non conveniens under § 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. The Supreme Court in the 1990 case of Dow Chem. Co.
v. Castro Alfaro ruled that this section precluded the courts from enforc-
ing the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It said that the statutory lan-
guage gave an absolute right to enforce wrongful death and personal in-
jury cases before the courts of Texas, so long as other civil procedure
requirements were met." A concurring opinion in this case outlines many
of the problems with forum non conveniens analysis, and it is therefore a
helpful case to examine for this purpose. Just as an aside, the Texas Leg-
islature recently passed a law § 71.051 which statutorily recognizes the
theory of forum non conveniens in the state courts.20 However, there are
still some suits pending under the old laws. Most of these lawsuits are for
personal injury claims on behalf of banana workers that were, among
other things, sterilized by the use of a chemical exported by Dow Chemi-
cal and Shell Oil to banana plantations around the world. The successful
suit of Castro Alfaro originated with Costa Rican banana workers. Other
19. Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Texas Supreme Court
1990) (Doggett J., concurring).
20. For a discussion of the old and new laws see Carl Christopher Scherz, Comment,
Section 71.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code-the Legislature's Answer to
Alfaro: Forum Non Conveniens in Personal Injiury and Wrongful Death Litigation, 46
BAYLOR L. REV. 99.
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banana workers around the world filed the same suit in the Texas courts.
However, recently Dow and Shell have been successful at implead-
ing an Israeli company that also manufactured the chemical at question.
They have then removed to the federal courts on diversity of citizenship
and dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in the federal courts of
the Fifth Circuit, which we will later discuss is one of the few remaining
circuits that does not recognize forum non conveniens in all cases, not
recognizing it for anti-trust lawsuits.21
A concurring opinion in Castro Alfaro listed five main reasons for
not allowing forum non conveniens. Justice Doggett noted that one, the
lawsuit was in the backyard of the defendants, some of the most powerful
corporations in the world; this could not be an inconvenience. He noted
that Shell had its Corporate headquarters minutes from the courthouse
and that Dow operated the country's largest chemical plant in the same
district where the trial was to be held. Most of the decisions to use this
chemical (even when its manufacture and use was banned in the U.S. for
causing sterility and other problems) would have been made in the Shell
Corporate headquarters. Both Dow and Shell enjoyed business protec-
tions from their operations in the district, why should they be insulated
from the legal consequences of their actions. 2
Two, Justice Dogget noted that the reason for forum non conveniens,
convenience, is a myth with modem technology. Either corporation can
fly their experts down to Costa Rica in a short plane ride to examine the
plaintiffs to find out if they are permanently sterile and what other effects
they suffer.23 Or they could rely upon doctors in Costa Rica and simply
mail or fax documents back to Houston. Justice Doggett quoted from
Calavo Growers of California v. Belgium:
A forum is not necessarily inconvenient because of its distance from pertinent
parties or places if it is readily accessible in a few hours of air travel. It will
often be quicker and less expensive to transfer a witness or a document than to
transfer a lawsuit. Jet travel and satellite communications have significantly
altered the meaning of 'non conveniens. 
24
Thirdly, Justice Dogget noted that a forum non conveniens dismissal
21. See generally, Delgado V. Shell Oil Co., 890 F.Supp. 1324. This case follows the
scenario described above.
22. See Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 681. "The decision to manufacture DBCP for
distribution and use in the third world was made by these two American companies in their
corporate offices in the United States. Yet now Shell and Dow argue that the one part of this
equation that should not be American is the legal consequences of their actions."
23. Id. at 684.
24. Id. at 684 (quoting Calavo Growers of California v. Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 969 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Newman J., concurring)).
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was usually a death knell to the lawsuit. "Empirical data available dem-
onstrate that less than four percent of cases dismissed under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens ever reach trial in a foreign court."'
Fourthly, Justice Doggett noted that "the misconduct of even a few
multinational corporations can affect untold millions around the world.,
26
Justice Doggett noted numerous instances where corporations shipped
dangerous items, such as children's sleepwear and pacifier, and danger-
ous chemicals, overseas. The theory of forum non conveniens essentially
resulted in insulation for the actions of these corporations. 7 To put it
more simply, it is unjust to ship products to other countries that are
banned for use in the United States.
Furthermore, Justice Doggett noted that the world is increasingly
interdependent. The chemicals that are used on bananas and other crops
come back to the United States when those products are shipped back to
the United States.2" This is similar to the argument made in Piper that
American consumers use these products: if they are found to be defective
overseas, they may affect consumers here in the United States as well.
The arguments made by Justice Doggett were powerful arguments
and should be made to any court contemplating forum non conveniens.
One case that followed some of the arguments that Justice Doggett
made was a case decided months before the Piper decision. This was the
Fiacco decision from the Federal District of the Southern District of New
York. The facts were similar to Piper in that it was an air crash of a heli-
copter. This time the crash occurred in Norway. The helicopter was
owned by a foreign company and chartered with a foreign company.
There were similar facts in all but one respect, one of the passengers was
an American.'
The trial court in that case made three rulings. One, the court noted
that "with respect to design and manufacture, the potential witnesses are
located in the United States."' The court seemed to imply that the fact
that it was a product manufacturing case and that all the design and
manufacturing took place in the district where the lawsuit was filed led to
not dismissing the lawsuit on the basis of forum non conveniens.
However, there were two other reasons that the court noted, that led
to the prevention of dismissal. One, the court refused to separate the
American plaintiff from the other plaintiffs, thereby creating two law-
suits. Instead, the court held that since there was an American, there was
25. ld. at 683.
26. Id. at 688.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 689. ... actions of our corporations affecting those abroad will also affect
Texans."
29. Fiacco v. United Technologies Corp., 524 F.Supp. 858, 858.
30. Id. at 86o.
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a "real and tangible interest in this forum. This factor augments in this
case the weight which normally should be given to the plaintiff's choice
of forum."'" As noted earlier in the discussion of the Gilbert case, one of
the elements of forum non conveniens is that the plaintiffs choice of fo-
rum is given added weight in weighing the private and public interest
factors. This normally gives more weight to the side of the plaintiff.
However, the Court in Piper held that a foreign plaintiff is to be given no
added weight to his/her choice of forum due to the fact that the presump-
tion is the forum is not local and therefore not convenient.
In Fiacco, the court combined the fact that much of the evidence was
in the United States and that there was an American plaintiff. It gave
added deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum and therefore ruled that
the Gilbert factors did not weigh in favor of dismissal. Furthermore, the
court said that the fact that the defendant might not be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the alternative forum unless the defendant gave consent,
was a factor for holding the trial in the present district.
In Howe, a 1 St Circuit decision and Linter, a 2nd Circuit decision, the
fact that there is an American plaintiff does not always tip the scales in
favor of the plaintiff. In those cases, American plaintiffs argued that the
case should not be dismissed to another forum on forum non conveniens
grounds. However, the courts in those cases gave added weight to the
plaintiff's choice of forum, but that was not enough to overcome the fac-
tors weighing against the plaintiff.32
Realistically, the Supreme Court has already ruled that airplane crash
products liability cases should be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds. However, the fact that one of the plaintiffs was American might
give enough added weight to keep the case in American courts. However,
I would say that with the Circuit Court cases of Linter and Howe, where
the courts ruled against the American in spite of giving added deference
to the American plaintiff's choice of forum, it might be hard to persuade
a court to refuse to dismiss even given the scenario of Fiacco today.
For those cases that do not include United States citizens as plain-
tiffs, I think in aircraft products liability cases, the ruling will go as it did
in the Magnin, a 1996 case. The facts of that case were similar to Piper
but with the alternative forum being France. The facts involved a French
31. Id.
32. See Allstate Life Insurance Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1001. The court in
this case did not rule that the American had an absolute right to trial in the United States. The
plaintiff's choice of forum should be given added deference creating a high hurdle, but when
all the Gilbert factors weigh against the plaintiff's choice, that weight can be overcome. See
also Howe v. Goldcorp. Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 953. "We cannot say that the dis-
trict court was clearly wrong in finding that the balance of conveniences favors suit in Can-




citizen who died piloting a privately owned plane in France.33 There was
a twist to this case. I presume that since there was such a battle to keep
the case in the Alabama state courts, that the Alabama state courts do not
recognize forum non conveniens dismissals. The estate of the pilot ini-
tially filed their case in Alabama state courts. However, one of the people
they named in their suit was "a designated manufacturing inspection rep-
resentative" theoretically of the FAA. Since federal employees can al-
ways remove to the Federal Courts on subject matter jurisdiction, the de-
fendants removed to federal court, where the case was dismissed under
forum non conveniens3
The court looked at the private and public interest factors much as
did the Court in Piper. The said the majority of evidentiary problems
would be due to the crash site being in France. They said that the French
equivalent of the FAA, who did a report on the crash would have to tes-
tify. They would have to fly over to Alabama, and their testimony would
have to be translated. Other witnesses under similar circumstances would
include maintenance witness, witnesses who would testify about the
flightworthiness of the pilot, and relatives who survived the pilots death
who would testify regarding damages. Once again, the court also said that
the fact that French law would apply led to the public interest factors
weighing towards dismissal. Finally, the court noted that since the plain-
tiff was foreign, there would be no added deference given to the plaintiffs
choice of forum.35
The court also noted that the plaintiff reasoned that there was no
contingency fee arrangement allowable in France and that there would be
no jury trial. The court dismissed both of these ideas, noting that if these
factors were taken into account, there would almost never be dismissal
since the U.S. is the only legal system that allows for civil jury trials and
contingency fee arrangements.36
The fact of the matter is that most of the evidentiary material would
come from reports by experts, experts on the crash, the design of the
motor, the failure rate, experts who examine the particular motor in ques-
tion, and so on. Most of these experts could write a report that could eas-
ily be translated and transported to Alabama. So it is not so easy to see as
the court makes it out that the majority of evidence would lead to the case
being held in France, especially since a significant portion of the evi-
dence would be the design specifications and manufacturing process, all
of which took place in Alabama.
33. Magain v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1426.
34. Id.
35. Magrin, 91 F.3d 1424, 1430.
36. See id.
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D. Special Venue Statutes
Special venue statutes have been enacted with various laws such as
RICO violations, antitrust violations, and securities and exchange viola-
tions. The reason they are important regarding forum non conveniens
analysis is that they have been cited as authority for not permitting dis-
missals on forum non conveniens grounds. The theory is that Congress
enacted that special venue statute to give a wide range of venue options to
the plaintiff due to the nature of the claim. Once filed under the special
venue statute, theoretically the courts have no power to dismiss under a
venue changing grounds such as forum non conveniens.
Venue traditionally has meant which court the plaintiff can file in out
of all the courts where subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic-
tion are found. Traditionally, the common law was that venue was where
the defendant was an inhabitant or where the defendant was a resident.
Now, in federal law, all venue is codified as either special venue statutes
or general venue statutes. An example of a special venue statute is that
found in the Clayton Act, which deals with antitrust claims that, "any suit
under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in
the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business."37
This language may be compared to that in the general venue statute
of 28 U.S.C. § 1391:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial
district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omission giv-
ing rise to the claim occurred... or (3) a judicial district in which the defen-
dants are subject to personal jurisdiction...."
So you can see that the special venue statute no longer expands the con-
cept of venue in diversity actions; the general venue statute actually al-
lowing for just as wide or wider venue choices as the special venue stat-
utes. The purpose of the special venue statute, however, when it was first
enacted, was to expand venue options.
So you may be asking yourself what does special venue statutes have
to do with forum non conveniens. As I noted at the outset of this section,
it is argued in many decisions that special venue statutes prevent forum
non conveniens dismissals.
37. Industrial Investment Development Corporation v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876,
890 n. 17 (5'h Cir. 1982) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 22).




As traced in numerous modem cases, including Industrial Investment
Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., a 1982 case and Capital Cur-
rency Exchange v. National Westminster Bank PLC, a 1998 case, the Su-
preme Court ruled in a case from 1948, commonly known as National
City Lines 39 that special venue statutes prevented dismissal of the case
due to forum non conveniens.' The case was an antitrust case "alleging
that the defendants conspired to monopolize public transportation in a
number of cities."4 The case was initially filed in the Federal District
Court of the Southern District of California, but the defendant bus com-
pany moved for it to be transferred to the Northern District of Illinois,
where its corporate headquarters was located, and where it believed
would be a more convenient trial.42 The Supreme Court ruled that the
case could not be dismissed or transferred on forum non conveniens
grounds due to the fact that the case was filed using the Clayton Act spe-
cial venue statute quoted above.43
Congress, soon after the trial, passed 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which
allowed for a forum non conveniens type transfer between federal district
courts. This was what the court in Capital Currency Exchange had to say
about this:
In September 1948, shortly after National City I was decided, Congress en-
acted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides that 'for the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.'
Section 1404(a) thus supplanted the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens for transfers between United States district courts .... Section
1404(a) does not apply in cases here the purportedly more convenient forum is
not a United States district court. In such cases, almost always involving for-
eign countries, the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens still gov-
ems.4
After Congress passed this new section to the Code of Civil Procedure,
defendant National City Lines again tried to transfer and this time the
transfer was approved by the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in what is know as the case National City Lines 11.4'
The Fifth Circuit has ruled in Mitsui that National City Lines 1I in no
39. See United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
40. See Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876, 890.
41. Capital Currency Exchange v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 606
(2 ' Cir. 1996).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F.3d 603, 607.
45. Id. See United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
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way overrules National City Lines I as regards the effect of the special
venue statute found in the Clayton Act on common law forum non con-
veniens. The Fifth Circuit explained its ruling in this way:
Defendants argue that the Supreme Court 'effectively nullified' its holding in
National City Lines by its second decision in that case.... Shortly after the
Court's first decision , Congress, in an unrelated move, enacted 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), which authorizes the district courts to 'transfer any civil action to
any other district or division' 'for the convenience of parties and witnesses.'
In National City Lines II, the Court, relying on the legislative history and the
broad term 'any civil action,' concluded that the transfer statute applied to
antitrust actions.... The Court in no way questioned its earlier holding con-
cerning the effect of 15 U.S.C. § 22 on common law forum non conveniens.
Since defendants can point to no stature authorizing dismissal of an action on
forum non conveniens grounds, National City Lines II does not help them in
any way.46
In other words, the Fifth Circuit believed that National City Lines II only
overruled National City Lines I as regards the codified venue transfer
statute. However, the Fifth Circuit still followed the ruling in National
City Lines I that the special venue statute in the Clayton Act prevented
transfer of cases on common law forum non conveniens grounds, i.e.
where the alternative forum is foreign.
The First Circuit overruled this type of reasoning in Howe and the
Second Circuit overruled the reasoning in Transunion.4 Howe regarded a
case where an American investor in a Canadian Investment Corporation
brought SEC charges against that corporation in Federal District Court in
Massachusetts. The investor alleged fraud in changing the bylaws of the
corporation to allow investment of more than 10% in a single company.
The company subsequently invested around 40% of its capital in two gold
companies each. The company lost money in this deal and the investor
sued. The investment company moved to dismiss the case on forum non
conveniens grounds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
filed an amicus brief on behalf of the investor claiming among other
things that the special venue statute of the Security and Exchange Act
prevented the court from dismissing the case on forum non conveniens
grounds.' The SEC reasoned as had the Fifth Circuit in Mitsui, that Na-
tional City Lines I prevented forum non conveniens dismissals. Essen-
tially, the SEC said that since National City Lines I had prevented dis-
46. Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876, 890 n.18.
47. See Howe v. Goldcorp. Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, see also Transunion v. Pep-
sico, Inc., 811 F.2d 127.
48. Howe, 946 F.2d 944, 144-47.
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missal of an antitrust suit on forum non conveniens grounds because that
antitrust suit carried with it a special venue statute, the First Circuit
should not allow dismissal in this SEC claim because the SEC claim also
has a special venue statute. '9 The court rejected the arguments in the ami-
cus brief for three reasons.
The first reason was that there was no legislative history supporting
the idea that the special venue statute in this case was meant by Congress
to prevent forum non conveniens transfers. The court noted that there
really was nothing different in the special venue statute from the general
venue statute, under which forum non conveniens transfers were allowed.
The Court said:
What is so special about a special venue statute? If a general venue statute
opening federal court doors (say, in New York) is compatible with an interna-
tional forum non conveniens transfer (say, to Italy) why does a special venue
statute which simply opens another court's doors (say, in California) suddenly
make the same international transfer unlawful?50
The second reason that the court gave for denying the special venue
statute effectiveness in preventing forum non conveniens transfers was
the court's interpretation of National City Lines H1. The SEC said, as had
the Fifth Circuit, that National City Lines H only overruled National City
Lines I for purposes of domestic transfers on forum non conveniens
grounds but not foreign transfers. The court noted that many courts had
contemplated this issue and few courts have held with the SEC. In addi-
tion, the court noted that at the very least National City Lines 1I did not
eliminate that possibility of forum non conveniens transfers to foreign
courts.5
Finally the court noted a public policy reason for dismissing the case
on forum non conveniens grounds even when there was a special venue
statute. The court noted:
We can find no good policy reason for reading the special venue statute as if
someone in Congress really intended them to remove the courts' legal power
to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens in an otherwise appropriate
case. The growing interdependence of formerly separate national economies,
the increased extent to which commerce is international, and the greater like-
lihood that an act performed in one country will affect citizens of another, all
argue for expanded efforts to help the world's legal systems work together, in
harmony, rahter than at cross purposes. To insist that American courts hear
49. Id. at 948.
50. Id. at 949.
51. Id.
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cases where the balance of convenience and the interests of justice require that
they be brought elsewhere will simply encourage an international forum shop-
ping that would increase the likelihood that decisions made in one country
will cause (through lack of awareness or understanding) adverse effects in an-
other, eroding uniformity or thwarting the aims of law and policy. And, to de-
prive American courts of their transfer power, when, but only when, one of
more than three hundred special venue statutes apply, would create a hodge-
podge, that would, or would not, bring about American judication of an es-
sentially foreign controversy, depending upon the pure happenstance of
whether Congress - at some perhaps distant period and likely out of a desire
to widen the plaintiffs venue choices in typically domestic cases - enacted a
special venue statute. 2
I quote this public policy argument against special venue statutes stand-
ing in the way of forum non conveniens dismissals, but also because it
does an excellent job of explaining why we have forum non conveniens
in the first place. Courts around the world are interrelated. So is business.
If we do not want them to work at cross purposes then we need forum
non conveniens to dismiss a case so that an essentially foreign case does
not wind up in the American courts, where the American courts would
alienate the foreign country and prevent trade with that country from
happening. Of course, the opposite is true as well. Since trade is global
now, why can't we say that all lawsuits touch upon American interests,
and the protagonists should therefore have access to American courts.
The Fifth Circuit has also limited its reasoning in Mitsui that Na-
tional City Lines I prevented forum non conveniens in situations where
there is a special venue statute and the alternative forum is foreign. The
Fifth Circuit in Kempe held that National City Lines 1 did not apply to
RICO violations, where RICO had a special venue statute.53 Therefore,
the only time that special venue statutes will prevent forum non conveni-
ens dismissals now is when the special venue statute is the Clayton Act
antitrust suit. However, the Fifth Circuit contemplated one other compo-
nent of antitrust law, and that is their ruling that antitrust law has no sub-
stantive counterpart in a foreign country.
E. Substantive Law of the Alternative Forum
Regarding change of substantive law in the Piper case, the Court
said:
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should
never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course,
52. Id. at 950.
53. See Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138, 1144.
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if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or un-
satisfactory that is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be
given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would
not be in the interests of justice. In these cases, however, the remedies that
would be provided by the Scottish courts do not fall within this category. Al-
though the relatives of the decedents may not be able to rely on a strict liability
theory, and although their potential damages award may be smaller, there is no
danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly.
54
There is no doubt from what the Court said above that it would take
an extremely unfavorable change in law, or perhaps a court that is so cor-
rupt that a trial cannot take place on favorable terms in order for it to hold
that there is no adequate alternative forum.
However, the Fifth Circuit not only has found the special venue stat-
ute of the Clayton Act to be a bar to forum non conveniens dismissals, it
has also found that no other foreign alternative forum allows for antitrust
claims to be a bar to dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. In other
words, the fact that the Fifth Circuit believes that foreign alternative fo-
rums would not recognize claims based on antitrust statutes means that
the alternative forum is inadequate due to change in substantive law.
In Mitsui, the Fifth Circuit said:
The treble damages action created for "private attorneys general" by § 4 of the
Clayton Act, while "designed primarily as a remedy,"55... is designed at least
,56in part to "penalize wrongdoers and deter wrongdoing' .... Since it is a well-
established principle of international law that "the Courts of no country execute
the penal laws of another,'57 ... we have little doubt that the Indonesian courts
would quite properly refuse to entertain plaintiffs' Sherman Act claim. A dis-
missal for forum non conveniens, then, would be the functional equivalent of a
decision that defendants' acts are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act."
The Fifth Circuit obviously believed that Sherman Act claims would
not be recognized in Indonesia, the alternative forum in tbis case, and that
therefore the suit should not be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds. It is peculiar that the reason the court gave for why the Indone-
sian courts would not recognize the Sherman Act, was that the treble
damages make the Act a private penal claim. The same argument was
54. Piper, 454 U.S. 235,254.
55. Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876, 891 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 486).
56. Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876, 891 (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477,485).
57. Id at 891 (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123, 6 LEd. 268 (1825)).
59. See id.
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made in Piper, that the substantive law would change and that the plain-
tiffs would not be able to get treble damages in a personal injury action as
a punitive measure. The Court in Piper however said that even though the
courts of Scotland would not recognize punitive damages and strict li-
ability, they do recognize other claims that would allow the lawsuit to
proceed. The Fifth Circuit apparently believed that without the Sherman
Act claims, which could be analogized as being similar to strict liability,
the lawsuit would fail entirely. There was no indication however that the
lawsuit in Mitsui would fail entirely. The plaintiffs would have other
claims on which to base their lawsuit, such as misrepresentation and
fraud. The Fifth Circuit, however, must have believed that without the
Sherman Act claims, the lawsuit would go nowhere, and that thus the
plaintiffs would be deprived of their lawsuit. Since the substantive law of
the alternative forum was inadequate, the lawsuit could not be dismissed
on forum non conveniens grounds. The alternative forum was considered
to be inadequate due to a change in the substantive law.
Apparently, the Fifth Circuit's ruling was limited to antitrust actions
because a similar argument was made in Kempe where RICO claims were
alleged, but the Fifth Circuit went ahead and dismissed the lawsuit on
forum non conveniens grounds. Kempe involved a Bahamian insurance
company that went bankrupt. In the liquidation proceedings it was alleged
that the company had a reinsurance scam going that allowed it to modify
the balance sheet. The company was created to insure an American oil
drilling company based out of New Orleans. It was alleged that there was
racketeering between these companies that allowed the scam to proceed."
The plaintiff alleged that RICO laws were similar to antitrust laws.
The plaintiff proposed that the purpose of RICO laws was to create a pri-
vate attorney general who would make essentially penal claims against
the defendants, much as in the case of the antitrust claims in Mitsui.a
The Fifth Circuit denied that the substantive law would have changed
so greatly that it would become, as in Piper, so clearly inadequate as to
be no remedy at all. The court noted the Supreme Court had held in a
case entitled Shea rsonlAmerican Express that "the private attorney gen-
eral role for the typical RICO plaintiff is simply less plausible than it is
for the typical antitrust plaintiff .... ,61 In other words, the court found that
the RICO statutes, unlike their antitrust counterparts, were not simply
penal statutes that would not be enforced in a foreign forum's court. The
court noted that the plaintiffs would not be deprived of any remedy, the
test from Piper. They noted that Bermuda, the alternative forum, would
59. See Kempe, 876 F.2d 1138, 1139-42.
60 SeeKempe, 876F.2d 1138, 1142.
61. Kempe, 876 F.2d 1138, 1144, (quoting Shearscn/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hen, 482 U.S. 220, 242).
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recognize "fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty,
and piercing the corporate veil counts of the liquidator's complaint."'
The court also examined the legislative history for RICO statutes but
that "our independent review of the legislative history does not disclose
that Congress intended directly or by fair inference to suggest that RICO
would be immune from the doctrine's (forum non conveniens) opera-
tion."'63
However, the Fifth Circuit refused to overturn their earlier decision
in Mitsui that antitrust lawsuits have no counterpart in a foreign forum.
They quoted from a 1983 Federal District court of the District of Colum-
bia in denying that antitrust lawsuits have a counterpart in foreign law:
Antitrust cases are unlike litigation involving contracts, torts, or other matters
recognized in some form in every nation. A plaintiff who seeks relief by
means of one of these types of actions may appropriately be sent to the courts
of another nation where presumably he will be granted, at least approximately,
what he is due. But the antitrust laws of the United States embody a specific
congressional purpose to encourage the bringng of private claims in the
American courts in order that the national policy against monopoly may be
vindicated. To relegate a plaintiff to the courts of a nation which does not rec-
ognize these antitrust principles would be to defeat this congressional direc-
tion by means of a wholly inappropriate procedural device.
64
The Second Circuit examined the substantive law issue of the alter-
native forum in Capital Currency Exchange. The Second Circuit, unlike
the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Federal District Courts, did
not recognize that antitrust claims were so singular to American law that
they would not be recognized in other courts. In other words, the Second
Circuit held that foreign forums would recognize claims similar to anti-
trust claims, so that there would be a remedy available to the plaintiff in
the foreign forum-and the lawsuit could be dismissed.
In Capital Currency Exchange the Second Circuit noted that "Eng-
lish courts will not enforce the Sherman Act."' However, they then noted
that "the availability of an adequate alternate forum does not depend on
the existence of an identical cause of action in the other forum." The
court then noted that anti-competitive actions may be challenged under
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, "which English courts are
62 Id. at 1145.
63. Id.
64. Kempe, 876 F.2d 1138, 1142, (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World
Airways, 568 F.Supp. 811, 818 (D.D.C. 1983)).
65. Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F.3d 603, 609.
66. Id. at 610 (quoting from PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.. 138 F.3d 65,
74 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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bound to enforce." 67 Basically, in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome, the second circuit found a rough equivalent of out antitrust statutes
here in the United States. They found that even antitrust claims have a
remedy in those foreign forums, those in the European Union, that have
ratified the Treaty of Rome.
However, the Second Circuit analysis did not end there. They also
contemplated whether these Articles that codify laws against anti-
competitive practices allow for a remedy, i.e. damages to be awarded. If
there was a right without a monetary remedy, then the court would not
have found that the Articles satisfy the requirement that the alternative
forum offer a remedy, or some law under which the plaintiffs can gain a
remedy. The court noted that although no plaintiff had ever received
monetary damages under Articles 85 & 86, in theory they could be got-
ten. The plaintiff's own expert on British law admitted as much. Further-
more, the court cited to a British case where the Law Lords of the House
of Lords had considered the question of whether monetary damages could
be awarded under Articles 85 & 86. The Law Lords held in dicta that you
could receive monetary damages although a final judgment was never
rendered in the case. 8
The Second Circuit has not been immune to the idea that the inability
to receive a remedy in a foreign forum provides an effective barrier to
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. The Second Circuit, in Irish
National Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta in 1984, ruled that
the inability to receive monetary damages suing in a foreign court would
prevent a forum non conveniens dismissal.
The case stands for more than that one proposition, so I will go into
detail regarding it now, rather than wait until later in my paper. The case
concerned a subrogated insurance company suing the air freight carrier of
a package of circuits that were damaged in route to destination between
Ireland and the United States. The insurance company had already paid
the insured for damages, but was attempting to collect the amount paid
from the freight carrier due to negligent handling of the circuits.'
There was a question of whether the alternative forum was the Re-
public of Ireland or the United Kingdom. However, the court resolved
this by stating that the courts of either country would apply the law in the
same fashion. They would apply the law so that the indemnification of
damages would be limited to U.S. $260, while the insured had already
paid out U.S. $120,000.70
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Irish National Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 90 (2d Cir.,
1984).
70. Id. at 91.
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The court noted that under the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff
would be allowed to bring its action '"before the court at the place of
destination,' which, in this case, was New York." ' The court also noted
that the evidence would also be mainly in New York, since apparently the
damage occurred to the circuits after they reached the U.S. customs. Its
wasn't until after customs that Aer Lingus handled them negligently.
72
In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff was a national of Ire-
land, which has signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with the United States. This treaty allowed Irish nationals to "national
treatment with respect to ... having access to the courts of justice..., both
in pursuit and in defense of (its) rights."" The language in this compact
between the U.S. and Ireland would give the plaintiff equal standing to
that of a United States citizen in terms of forum non conveniens analysis.
As the court said, "Because of the existence of the two international com-
pacts, the district court should have applied the same forum non conveni-
ens standards that it would have applied to a United States citizen. It spe-
cifically failed to do so, and this failure tainted its entire holding."74 What
the equal footing with an American citizen language does, is eliminate
the idea from Piper that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be
given added deference due to the plaintiff being foreign. Therefore, this
plaintiff's choice of forum, New York should be given added deference
when weighing the Gilbert factors.
Finally, the court noted that the standard of review was abuse of dis-
cretion, but that that standard of review still left room for overturning if
the analysis was done totally wrong.
Given all these factors, that the alternative forum would not give a
remedy, that the Gilbert factors led to there being substantial weight on
the plaintiff" side, that the plaintiff's choice of forum should be given
added weight in weighing the Gilbert factors due to the United States
having signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the
state where the plaintiff was a citizen, and lastly that the abuse of discre-
tion standard of the court in reviewing the district court's opinion left
open the possibility of overturning the lower court's decision, the Second
Circuit overturned the lower courts ruling and prevented a forum non
conveniens dismissal.
In summary of this section, the Fifth Circuit would decline to dismiss
a case brought under clear antitrust laws of this country. They would do
71. Id. (quoting Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air (hereinafter Warsaw Convention), art. 28(1), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. §
1502).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United
States-Ireland, art. VI(1)(c), 1 U.S.T. 785,790-91, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, at 8).
74. Aer Lingus, 739 F.2d 90, 92.
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so for two reasons. One, they have held that National City Lines 1 was
never overturned as regards common law forum non conveniens. They
believe that they are prevented from dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds when the Clayton Act special venue statutes are invoked. Two,
the Fifth Circuit also has ruled that antitrust laws are not recognized by
other countries. They believe that they are prevented from dismissing on
forum non conveniens grounds when the claim is an antitrust claim. This
argument would also be important to make in other circuits, because it
may be found that countries that do not have an equivalent to the
Sherman Act, that do not fall under the Treaty of Rome, for instance, do
not have any remedy available to the plaintiff and thus are not adequate
alternative forums. The District of Columbia Federal District Courts also
conform to this analysis. They believe that antitrust claims are so singular
to the laws of the United States that you cannot make the same claim in
foreign courts, thus making those courts inadequate alternative forums.
Finally, the Second Circuit has not held that antitrust claims are a bar
to forum non conveniens dismissals. In Captial Currency Exchange they
noted the courts of the United Kingdom have recognized claims for anti-
competitive practices and that they can give remedies, if they so decide.
However, this was due to the United Kingdom having ratified the Treaty
of Rome, which is a European Union treaty. States outside the European
Union may still have no authority for recognizing anti-competition
claims. Therefore, the argument should still be made before the Second
Circuit where the state has not signed the Treaty of Rome, that antitrust
claims are so singular to the United States that the alternative forum will
not recognize them, and therefore the alternative forum is not adequate.
However, regarding the Fifth Circuit's holdings that special venue acts
prevent forum non conveniens dismissals, the Second Circuit, as well as
all others that have ruled on this subject, does not recognize this ruling.
They do not believe that special venue statutes prevent forum non con-
veniens dismissals.
F. How the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation affects the
analysis
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation negate, according
to the Second Circuit, the holding of Piper that a foreign plaintiff's
choice of forum should not be given added weight under the Gilbert
analysis. The Second Circuit has held in Aer Lingus and Blanco v. Banco
Industrial de Venezuela that since friendship treaties give the citizens of
the foreign status equal status before the law of the United States as to
citizens of the United States, the plaintiff in a state that has signed a treaty
should be given due deference to its choice of forum, as would an Ameri-
can citizen. In Aer Lingus, this teamed with other factors in the plaintiff's
favor lead to dismissal of the forum non conveniens claims. In Blanco
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there were no other factors, and therefore the factor of added deference to
the plaintiff's choice of forum did not play into consideration. However,
the reasoning of this argument should be argued before all courts. I will
go in to this case in the following section, where I discuss how some re-
cent cases have interpreted the forum non conveniens doctrine.
II. REcENT CASES AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela
75
This case arose from the construction of a large, privately owned
residential apartment development in Maracay, Venezuela. Plaintiff con-
struction company entered into an agreement with the Banco Industrial de
Venezuela (BIV) and a Middle Eastern Consortium (MEC) to borrow
money from the MEC, while allowing BIV to disburse the funds and
oversea the financial management of the project. BIV refused to disburse
funds to the construction company even though the construction company
alleged that it had completed all the work on the project. Blanco, repre-
senting the shareholder's of the construction company then sought to sue
BIV in the Southern District of New York Federal Court on claims in-
volving breach of contract, fiduciary duty and other claims all arising
from the failure to allegedly disburse the funds properly.76
This case is most frequently cited for the proposition that foreign na-
tionals from states that have signed Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Naviga-
tion and Commerce must be accorded the same access to U.S. courts as
that provided to American citizens. Piper had said that "because the cen-
tral purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the
trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference."77
However, since the Treaty of Friendship accords equal status before the
courts of this country to citizens of other countries that have signed such
a treaty with the U.S., and Venezuela is one of those countries, the plain-
tiff's forum in this case should be given equal deference to that of an
American citizen. In other words, it should be accorded added deference
because it is the plaintiff's choice of forum.
However, the Gilbert factors still weighed against the plaintiff in this
case. The court concluded that Venezuelan law would govern. The fact
that Venezuelan law would govern was a factor against holding the trial
in New York, just as this factor had weighed against holding the trial in
New York in Gilbert and against Pennsylvania in Piper.8 Other weights
against the plaintiff's choice of forum was that the apartment buildings
were located in Venezuela and they would have to be inspected to show
75. Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 997 F.2d 974 (2d. Cir., 1993).
76. Id. at 976-78.
77. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 256.
78. Blanco, 997 F.2d 974,983.
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that they met the specifications for disbursement." This related to the
factor of relative ease of access to sources of proof. Finally, regarding
other access to sources of proof would be the project documents, the bank
documents, witnesses as to what those documents meant, and the fact that
all the witnesses would testify in Spanish.8° These would all be in Vene-
zuela. Thus, the court ruled that even given added deference to the plain-
tiff's choice of forum, there would still be a weight of factors balanced
against the plaintiff's choice of forum, New York, and in favor of the
defendant Bank's alternative forum, Venezuela.
Once again, I note that there is considerable difference of opinion
over these factors. Some commentators have held that it is not an incon-
venience to bring the evidence over to the United States in the form of
reports or certain key witnesses. For instance, even given that the case
would take place in Venezuela, the judges are not qualified to go to the
construction site and determine if the apartment complex has been com-
pleted to the specifications of the disbursement in the contract. You
would need the testimony of an engineer, one that could easily be ap-
pointed by the court (to achieve a lack of bias that you would find if each
side appointed their own separate engineers) to go do the inspection and
write a report to the court. Given the easily resolvability of that central
issue, it is difficult to see exactly how it would be inconvenient to hold
the trial in New York.
This case, however, touched on two other issues. The first issue was
whether or not Venezuela was an adequate forum for lack of a remedy.
One of the reasons that was given in Piper as to why an alternative forum
could be inadequate was due to the possibility that the courts would be so
unjust that the plaintiff could not get a fair trial.81 The plaintiff, in this
case, argued that the alternative forum, Venezuela, would be so biased
against them that they could not get a fair trial. The reason they offered
for this argument was that the bank was essentially an arm of the gov-
ernment, being fully owned by the government. The government would
not let the money be taken from this bank, they would exert pressure on
the judges involved to force them to rule against the contractor.82 The
court did not factor this argument in much. They noted that Venezuela
was a reputable country and that the U.S. courts routinely recognized
judgments from that country. Furthermore, the noted that Venezuela was
selected as an option in the forum selection clause of the contract for
where the disputes may be litigated should they arise.83
79. Id.
80 Id. at 982.
81. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 254.




This brings us to the last issue that of whether the forum selected in
the forum selection clause will cause the court to favor the choice of fo-
rum selected by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that they had chosen
New York as a forum in the forum selection clause. They felt that the
Supreme Court ruling in a case called MIS Bremen v. Zapata meant that
the Second Circuit must respect their choice of forum. In MIS Bremen the
Supreme Court ruled for dismissal of the case from the Southern District
of Florida, noting that the parties had agreed to London Court of Justice
as the choice of forum should a dispute arise. 4 The Second Circuit ruled
against this argument, however, distinguishing from MIS Bremen in that
the language of the contract had been concrete. The language of this con-
tract was equivocal, and gave New York, England and Venezuela as
choices in the forum selection clause. The Second Circuit said that since
the plaintiff allowed Venezuela to be one of the chosen sites in the forum
selection clause, they could not argue that it would be impermissible to
dismiss the trial to that forum.85
In summary, the Second Circuit upheld dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds due to the fact that the Gilbert factors weighed against
the plaintiff's choice of forum even given added deference to the plain-
tiff's choice, even given the plaintiffs complaint that the courts of Vene-
zuela were not so corrupt that you could not get a fair trial, and even
though New York was a forum selected by the contract.
B. Murray v. British Broadcasting Corporation
6
Murray is a British citizen who created a costume for a Mr. Blobby
for a British television show on the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC). The costume became the standard attire for a character known as
Mr. Blobby. Mr. Blobbys were then marketed for sale as a toy within the
United Kingdom, and they were being contemplated for sale in the
United States. Murray brought what was seen by the court as essentially a
copy-right infringement claim in the U.S. courts versus the BBC.87
Three issues arose under this case. The first issue was whether the
plaintiff Murray's choice of forum was due added weight in the Gilbert
balancing scale. As I noted before, the Second Circuit, which ruled in this
case as well, already said that citizens of states who had signed Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States were due
equal status under law to that of an American citizen, and therefore, due
84. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), reprinted in ROSENBERG,
HAY & WEINTRAUB, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS CASES AND MATERIALS, TENTH EDITION 169-170
(1996).
85. Blanco, 997 F.2d 974, 979.
86. Murrayv. British Broadcasting Corp., 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1996).
87. Id. at 289.
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deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum in the Gilbert analysis. Un-
fortunately for plaintiff Murray, no such treaty has been signed with the
United Kingdom. However, both the United States and the United King-
dom have signed the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. This treaty guarantees that the law of the forum where the
violation occurred governs any dispute brought in that country.88 Plaintiff
Murray argued that that meant he should be given equal status as an
American citizen before the courts of the United States. The court ruled
that this convention does not call for equal status before the courts of the
United States because nowhere does it use such language. The court ruled
that if they had meant for equal status to be given then the treaty nego-
tiators would have put that in because they knew from the Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation what language was necessary for
foreigners to be granted equal status to American citizens. 89
Furthermore, plaintiff Murray argued in the alternative that this was
the congressional intent when it was ratified by Congress. The Second
Circuit saw nothing in the legislative history that would justify such an
interpretation of the Berne convention. For these reasons, no specific lan-
guage within the treaty and no legislative history, the Second Circuit held
that plaintiff Murray, who was a British citizen, should not be given equal
status before the courts.9" Therefore, his choice of forum, since he was a
foreigner, should not be given added deference, as occurred also in Piper.
A second issue in this case was whether there was an adequate alter-
native forum. The plaintiff Murray argued that since he could not afford a
lawyer in the United Kingdom due to there being no contingency fee ar-
rangements allowed in that country. He claimed that it would cost from
100,000 to 200,000 pounds to bring his case to trial in the U.K. This was
beyond his means. The court noted his claim, but said, unlike the Elev-
enth Circuit in Magnin, that his claim was just one of the many private
interest factors which the court must take into account.91 The Eleventh
Circuit said that it would be given no weight in the analysis at all.9"
Taking into account the Gilbert private and public interest factors,
the court found that the case did not really have much to do with the
United States or the Southern District of New York at all. The court said:
The central issue in (this) dispute concerns the circumstances surrounding the
88. Id. at 290, See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Paris text, July 24, 1971, Art. V. paragraph 2, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99 h Cong., 2d Sess.
40 (1986) reprinted in 6 DAVID NIMER & MELVILLE B. NiMMER, NLMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
Appendix 27-5 (1995).
89. Murray, 81 F.3d 287, 290-91.
90. Id. at 291.
91. ld. at 292.
92. Magnin, 91 F.3d 1424, 1430.
[Vol. 6:247
99ORUM NON CONVENIENS
creation of Mr. Blobby. Once that dispute is resolved, the right to exploit the
character will be quickly resolved. The crux of the matter, therefore, involves
a dispute between British citizens over events that took place exclusively in
the United Kingdom. Moreover, it appears that much of the dispute over the
creation of Mr. Blobby implicates contract law. British law governs those is-
sues. The United States thus has virtually no interest in resolving the truly dis-
puted issues.93
Even given added deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum, I do not
think the court would have ruled against a forum non conveniens dis-
missal. The factors weigh too heavily in favor of a British forum.
C. Gemini Capital Group, Inc. v. Yap Fishing Corp.94
Plaintiff Gemini, a group of investors and tuna fishermen, became
business partners with the State of Yap of the Federated States of Micro-
nesia and some others in a tuna fishing venture, which they named the
Yap Fishing Corporation (YFC). The YFC negotiated a loan with the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an agency of the United States
government for a 9 million dollar loan. The plaintiffs were to manage the
vessels while the defendants were to provide logistical and other support,
including purchase of some of plaintiff's vessels. The agreement went
sour and the state of Yap took the vessels into receivorship and began
managing them. OPIC sued some of the plaintiffs in Federal District
Court in the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs claim specific enforce-
ment of contracts paying them money to manage the vessels and paying
them money to buy other vessels and RICO violations in that the state of
Yap was like an organized crime syndicate conspiring to rip them off.95
The court discussed four different issues: (1) deference to plaintiff's
choice of forum, (2) whether there was an adequate alternative forum, (3)
the private interest factors, and (4) the public interest factors.
Regarding deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum, the plaintiff's
made one essential claim for deference to their choice of Hawaii. The
plaintiff's argued that since they are American citizens, their choice of an
American court was due greater deference. The Ninth Circuit denied this,
stating that since the plaintiff's were not residents of Hawaii, but of Cali-
fornia, that therefore, the plaintiff's choice of Hawaii was not due greater
deference. It was not their local court, therefore it was due not greater
deference.96
Regarding the issue of whether Yap was an adequate alternative fo-
93. Murray, 81 F.3d 287,293.
94. Gemini Capital Group, Inc. v. Yap Fishing Corp., 150 F.3d 1088 (91' Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 1090-91.
96. Id. at 1091.
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rum, the plaintiff's essentially made two claims. (1) Yap was not an al-
ternative forum because it would not entertain RICO claims. The court
said that this was not true; Yap courts had claims that they could sue un-
der, and had claims that in some ways mirrored RICO claims, therefore
Yap was'an appropriate forum. (2) Yap was an inadequate legal system.
This was a variation on the argument heard in Blanco that since the cor-
poration, the plaintiffs were suing was owned by the government of Yap,
the courts of Yap could not be expected to give them a fair trial. The
court summarily denied that Yap was corrupt, and then denied this claim
because the plaintiff's did not bring it up at the lower court level and thus
the argument was not in the record and they were precluded from bring-
ing it before the court now.97
Regarding the private interest factors, the Circuit Court made a num-
ber of holdings. The OPIC officers, who were allegedly part of the RICO
scheme and thus would have to testify, could just as easily fly to Yap as
they could to Hawaii. One of the officers of Gemini was bankrupt and
could not afford to fly to Yap. The court held that he could just as easily
fly to Yap as to Hawaii. The plaintiffs argued that the district court gave
too much weight to the factor of viewing the premises. The court said that
this was irrelevant, but that the district court was right in that most of the
evidence was in Yap. Finally, the Circuit Court held that since a trial was
already begun in Yap on essentially the same issues that that factor
weighed towards dismissal. The factor that the court was referring to was
the enforceability of judgment. Any judgment from Hawaii would have to
be taken to Yap for enforcement. It would be unlikely that Yap would
recognize judgment until judgment in Yap on the same issue was ren-
dered.98
Finally, the court weighed the public interest factors. The court said
that in spite of the fact that some of the contract agreements for the man-
agement of the vessels chose Hawaii as the forum in a forum selection
clause, that Yap law would govern the proceedings. Since Yap law gov-
erned, it was mainly seen as a localized controversy to be decided by the
state of Yap.99
This case is novel for the fact that the court held that no deference
would be given an American plaintiff who had chosen an American fo-
rum because that forum was not the home state of the plaintiff. In ruling
that other countries had legal equivalent to RICO laws, the Ninth Circuit
was simply ruling in keeping with other courts. Also, the ruling that Yap
had courts that were not corrupt is in keeping with most other cases ex-
amined in this paper. As in Blanco there was a reluctance to rule that the
97. Id. at 1092-93.
98. Id. at 1093-94.
99. Id. at 1094-95.
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courts of a foreign country, especially one in which the plaintiffs chose to
do business in, were corrupt. The Ninth Circuit did look at the evidentiary
factors, and as in so many cases, ruled that the locality where most of the
action occurred, such as the operation of the vessels, was the deciding
factor over the place of contract. This is roughly equivalent to the air-
plane crash cases, where the operation of the plane and the site of the
crash are given extra weight over the forum where the manufacturing and
design took place. The Ninth Circuit, in keeping with other decisions,
refused to second guess the district court's conflict of laws analysis. Al-
though the choice of law does weigh heavily in that localized controver-
sies need local forums, one of the public interest factors, forum non con-
veniens analysis does not seem to be the place where circuit courts will
engage in extensive choice of law analysis. Finally, the Ninth Circuit
looked at the enforceability of judgment issue and noted that because a
lawsuit had already begun in Yap that that weighed against this factor.
This was due the fact any judgment rendered in Hawaii would have to go
to Yap for enforcement, where it would have to wait on the Yap courts
ruling in the other case. One other case I mentioned previously, held
similarly. In the Linter case, the court also weighed the fact that a case on
the same facts and issues was already being heard in Australia as a factor
for dismissal."
III. CONCLUSION
From Gilbert there were three traditional elements to forum non con-
veniens: an adequate alternative forum, the public and private interest
factors to be balanced in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum or the
defendants choice of forum, and added deference to the plaintiffs choice
of forum. The court in Piper changed the way other courts look at those
factors. The court held that change in substantive law between the forum
initially filed in and the alternative forum should not matter to a forum
non conveniens analysis unless the change was so drastic as to allow for
no remedy. The court also held that only if the foreign court was so unjust
as to prevent a remedy would that be appropriately taken into the analy-
sis. Finally, the Court in Piper looked at the evidence as lining up where
the events that led to the accident took place as having more evidentiary
value than those events leading to the design and manufacture of the
product. Judge Doggett in the Castro Alfaro decision in the Texas State
Courts did not think that to be a fair analysis because (1) the plaintiff is
suing in the backyard of the defendant where it has its corporate head-
quarters, what could be more convenient for the defendant than that, (2)
American consumers have a vested right to be protected from products
that are used in this country and others that are manufactured faultily in
100. Allstate Life Insurance Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1002.
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our country and are being subjected to a suit to prevent future faulty
products, (3) A dismissal in all but 4% of the cases means that the case
will never go to trial, and (4) unjust to ship products known to be defec-
tive to third world countries who have no legal enforcement mechanism
to prevent this.
In Howe it was held that there was nothing special about special
venue statutes that the use of which prevented dismissal on forum non
conveniens. In spite of that the Fifth Circuit has held that the special
venue statutes of the antitrust acts, found in the Clayton Act, prevent
common law forum non conveniens dismissals when the alternative fo-
rum is another country. They hold thus because they believe that a Su-
preme Court decision in the 1947 National City Lines I case has never
been overruled.
Regarding substantive law, the courts of many cases have heard the
claim that a change in substantive law renders the alternative forum in-
adequate. Most courts side with the Supreme Court in Piper that there
must be no remedy available in the foreign forum, or that the foreign fo-
rum must be so corrupt as to render a remedy impossible. No court in the
cases I examined has ever considered another country's court so corrupt
as to prevent forum non conveniens transfers, although the argument was
made in Blanco and in Gemini.
The Fifth Circuit has held that in antitrust cases there can be no rem-
edy expected in the foreign forum, and therefore these cases should not
be dismissed. The Second Circuit has held this tenant of the Fifth Circuit
to not hold weight, at least as far as the European Union signatories of the
Treaty of Rome goes. The theory is that the Treaty of Rome provides a
right of action for antitrust cases and therefore there is a remedy. But it is
a possibility that the Second Circuit might hold differently regarding an-
titrust cases when the forum is in a state that is not a signatory of the
Treaty of Rome. Regarding RICO and Securities claims, it is pretty much
held that all other countries have laws that give rise to similar claims,
thus there would not be enough of a change in substantive law to prevent
dismissal of these claims.
Regarding Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the
Second Circuit has held that since the language of the treaty gives equal
status to foreign citizens of signatories of such treaties with the United
States, the foreign plaintiff's choice of forum should be given added def-
erence as an American citizen's choice would. However, the Berne Con-
vention does not have similar language and so foreign citizens of states
that are signatories to that convention will not be given added deference.
The cases I summarized in the last section of the paper give credence
to the idea that not much has changed since Piper. The weighing of the
Gilbert factors still mainly goes against the plaintiff, usually because the
place of the crash or conflict occurred in the foreign forum. The choice of
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law analysis is usually made haphazardly as it was in the Piper district
court case. The circuit court in Piper which did a modem, in depth analy-
sis of choice of law found that the choice of law favored the United
States. However, that was overruled and the Supreme Court specifically
said that such an in depth analysis was not necessary. However, using a
more cursory analysis, if it is found that the alternative forum's law
would apply, then that usually weighs heavily towards dismissal. Finally,
in one final twist, if a case has already been started in a foreign forum on
the same issues that usually weighs against the plaintiff.
Overall, it appears from the cases mentioned in this paper that for-
eign plaintiffs would have a difficult time getting past the barrier of fo-
rum non conveniens in American courts, especially on products liability
claims. In addition, American plaintiffs who file lawsuits in the American
courts on matters whose essential evidentiary matters take place in other
countries would also have a difficult time proceeding past a forum non
conveniens dismissal.

